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0.1. Introduction
Aristotle’s discussions of natural teleology distinguish two ways of being necessary. One
of them stands in opposition to being for the sake of something while the other one does not.
Aristotle’s distinction in these contexts is not like the one you may be familiar with between
physical, metaphysical, and logical necessity. He seems to have two other notions of necessity
in mind. I think the notions are philosophically interesting, and I want to understand them
better.
Now, my work on this starts from an exegetical question. The second kind of necessity is a
matter of being needed for the realization of an end, and when something is necessary in this
way, Aristotle says that it is necessary ‘hypothetically’ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως). My talk today stems
partly from an inquiry into the question what the phrase 'hypothetically necessary' means.
Most scholars seem to agree with John Cooper that when Aristotle calls something 'hypothet-
ically necessary', he means precisely that the thing is necessary for the achievement of an end.
But nobody has explained how Aristotle could use the phrase to express this meaning. In an
effort to understand this, I made an examination of how Aristotle uses the word ὑπόθεσις
throughout his corpus, and, more specifically, how he uses the phrase ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. And I
have concluded that—in the absence of an explicit stipulation or some other special move,
which Aristotle does not make—the phrase cannot be used to express the meaning ‘necessary
for an end’. We can discuss this later if you like. But my claim is that when Aristotle calls
something hypothetically necessary, he means no more than that it is necessary on an as-
sumption, where q is necessary on the assumption that p iff it is not necessary that q, and it is
necessary that if p then q.
There is only one passage where it’s difficult to understand the phrase in the way I suggest,
and it is tempting to think it needs a richer meaning, like necessary for the achievement of an
end. This is the first half of Physics II.9. One of my aims here is to go through this passage in
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some detail, and argue that we can in fact make sense of it while reading ‘necessary ἐξ ὑποθέ-
σεως’ as meaning simply ‘necessary on an assumption’.
My second aim is to explain the sort of necessity that Aristotle distinguishes from being
needed, the sort that stands in opposition to teleology. Most commentators identify this sort
of necessity with what I will call ‘Straight necessity’, where (speaking roughly) something is
‘Straight necessary’ if there is no way things could be such that it would not obtain.1 (I’m
thinking that physical, metaphysical, and logical necessity are subspecies of straight necessi-
ty.) But I will argue against this identification. Aristotle seems to be talking about something
else, which I will call ‘Aimless necessity’, and I will suggest that it is a matter of being effi-
ciently caused by an aimless power.
My hope is that these claims will help us better understand Aristotle's teleology. But these
claims are also part of a (tentative) narrative I am exploring concerning the early stages of
philosophical thought about necessity. Although the language of necessity was in widespread
use before Aristotle, he seems to be the first person to attempt a systematic philosophical ac-
count of it. The story I’m exploring is that the notions of necessity Aristotle inherited were in-
terestingly different from the notion he passed down. I cannot defend this story here, but the
idea is this: Aristotle inherited a range of notions on which being necessary centrally involves
being caused in certain ways; and he crystallized out of these something closer to a purely
modal notion, where something’s being necessary says little or nothing about what sorts of
causes it has or lacks.2 What he crystallized was what I am calling 'Straight Necessity'. In my
view, Aristotle took Straight Necessity to be the central case, and he tried to show how to un-
1. (Ross & Aristotle, 1924) i.299, commenting on Metaph. Δ.5, identifies the third kind of necessity in Δ.5
(‘that which cannot be otherwise’) with the second kind of necessity in PA 1.1, 642a32 (dingbat-necessity), as well
as PA 639b24 (unqualified necessity applying to eternal things), Metaph. E 1026b28 (things that are always and
necessarily thus), An. Post. 94b37 (in accordance with nature and impulse). In his comments on Phys. II.9, he
identifies unqualified necessity with ‘the necessity of a result which must follow from certain conditions’ (Ross &
Aristotle, 1936, p. 531).
2. (Leunissen, 2010) and (Kupreeva, 2011) speak of a difference between modal and causal senses of necessity.
However, their understanding of the distinction is not the same as mine.
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derstand preexisting notions of necessity in terms of it. This should be clear from T3, which
we will get to in a few minutes.
But let us begin with a problem that seems to arise from the way Aristotle sets up the pas-
sage from II 9 on which I plan to focus.
0.2. An opposition between necessity and teleology
Physics II 8 begins as follows:
T1 We must explain, first, why nature is among the causes that are for the sake of
something, and then about the necessary and how it figures in natural affairs.
(Phys. II 8, 198b10-12)
The pairing of topics in this sentence raises a question, namely: how are the two topics sup-
posed to be connected? Does the question whether or not a given thing is necessary have any
bearing on the question whether or not it is for the sake of something? Aristotle seems to
think so. A few lines down he sets himself the challenge of answering the following question:
T2 What is to prevent nature from acting, not for the sake of something or be-
cause it is better, but in the way that Zeus makes rain, not in order that the
crops grow but from necessity? (Phys. II 8, 198b16–19)
This question, formulated as it is with a ‘not’ and a ‘but’, signals an opposition between be-
ing necessary and being for the sake of something.
It is not immediately clear what this opposition amounts to. Since Aristotle recognizes
several meanings of the word ‘necessity’ (ἀνάγκη), there are several sorts of opposition he
might in principle have in mind. The first thing to consider is whether he sees any incompati-
bility between teleology and the kind of necessity that he regards as the primary kind. He de-
scribes this kind of necessity in terms of the impossibility of being otherwise, and he ascribes
it, among other things, to scientific theorems and to eternal beings.3 Now, with respect to this
kind of necessity, we can find examples in Aristotle’s writings that exhibit every possible com-
3. References for the primary notion of necessity.
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bination of necessity or contingency, on the one hand, with aims or aimlessness, on the other.
There are things that are contingent and not for the sake of anything, for example whatever
occurs by luck or by chance.⁴ There are things that are contingent and for the sake of some-
thing, for example deliberate actions.⁵ There are things that are necessary and not for the sake
of anything, for example mathematical objects and the truth of logical principles.⁶ Finally,
there are things that Aristotle believes to be both necessary and for the sake of something, for
example the rotation and the existence of the outermost heavenly sphere.⁷
Aristotle’s acknowledgment of these four kinds of case indicates that his primary notion
of necessity is independent of teleology, neither opposed to it nor aligned with it. We will
have to look for a different kind of necessity that is opposed to teleology.
Before proceeding, let us pause for a moment on the subject of ‘not… but…’ sentences.
(My argument in Section 4.3 will turn on another key sentence of this form.) This sort of sen-
tence is only felicitous when the ‘not’-limb and the ‘but’-limb are seen as alternatives to each
other. However, the two limbs need not be strictly incompatible. For example, when Hamlet
says, ‘I shall in all my best obey you, madam,’ he somewhat pointedly does not address the
king but the queen. Of course, it is possible to address the king and the queen. Parallel to this,
just because it is possible to be both necessary and for the sake of something, it does not auto-
matically follow that it is wrong to say ‘not necessary but for the sake of something’. Still,
there is something to be explained here. The king and the queen do not strictly exclude each
other as addressees, but it is easy to see that they are alternatives. With being necessary and
being for the sake of something, on the other hand, we have two properties for which (1)
there is no obvious range of alternatives to which both belong, and (2) the presence or ab-
sence of one implies nothing about the presence or absence of the other. When ‘necessity’ sig-
4. REF
5. As Aristotle explains, REF, a sensible person deliberates exclusively about things that are neither necessary
nor impossible.
6. REF
7. REF
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nifies simply the impossibility of being otherwise, the phrase ‘not for the sake of something
but necessary’ sounds like ‘not blue but heavy’. 
0.3. Varieties of necessity
So to start, let’s look at T3 and T4 to get an overview of some notions of necessity which Aris-
totle distinguishes. Text 3 comes from Metaphysics Δ 5. Aristotle here describes three senses
of the word ‘necessary’.
T3 We call necessary:
[needed:] that without which, as a contributory cause, something cannot live
[…] or without which something good cannot exist or come to be, or something
bad cannot be thrown off or taken away […];
[compulsory:] the compulsory and compulsion: this is what impedes and hin-
ders in opposition to impulse and choice […];
[straight necessary:] and if something cannot be otherwise, we say that it is
necessarily so.
(Aristotle goes on in this passage to say:)
All the others are in some way called necessary in accordance with this last ne-
cessity. (Metaph. Δ 5, 1015a20–36)
So we have here three ways of using the word ‘necessary’. I can say that something is nec-
essary in order to convey that it is needed: ‘Why did you hire him?’ — ‘It was necessary in or-
der to move up in the Leiter rankings’. I can say that something was necessary in order to
convey that it was forced upon me—at least, I could have in 1677, and the corresponding
thing could be done in ancient Greek.⁸ ‘Why did you launch the missiles?’ — ‘I couldn’t help
it, the villain forced (or necessitated(?), in Greek ἠνάγκασε) my hand onto the panel.’ And fi-
nally, there is what I’m calling straight necessity, which Aristotle himself seems to regard as
the central case, and which also seems rather close to the more purely modal notions opera-
8. From the OED, s.v. ‘necessary’: ‘A.II.6.b Enforced by another; compulsory. 1655 Fuller Ch. Hist. ix. vi. §51
In the following words, he taketh away all necessary Oaths (and leaveth none but voluntary). 1677 W. Hughes
Man of Sin ii. vii. 115 Such Penance, were it voluntary, deserveth greatly to be admired at; but when 'tis necessary,
and upon a Prince, is worthy of utmost detestation.’
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tive in philosophical discussions today. Something is straight-necessarily so if it cannot be
otherwise than so.
As I mentioned earlier, Aristotle seems to be the first person who explicitly characterizes
necessity in the third way. I hypothesize that what he did was to take over a range of existing
notions, crystallize this one out of them, and then claim primacy for this notion, while
proposing a way in which other existing usages could be derived from, or at least related to,
it.
There is another passage in the Parts of Animals which seems to bring in one more notion
of necessity. This is text 4 on the handout:
T4 Necessity signifies either that
[needed:] if that for the sake of which will be, it is necessary to have these
things; or that
[•:] things are, and are naturally disposed (pephuke), thus. (PA I 1, 642a32 ff.)
The first notion looks very close to what I labeled ‘NEEDED’ in text 3. The second notion is
described very sparingly, and for the moment I am just labeling it with a dingbat (•). Sir
David Ross, in his commentary on the Metaphysics, identifies •-necessity with the notion I
have labeled ‘straight necessity’ in Text 3. And many scholars (including John Cooper) follow
him in this. I suggest, instead, that this is a distinct notion of necessity, and that this notion of
necessity is the one that Aristotle treats as standing in opposition to teleology. 
To get there, let us now turn to the text I want to focus on, in Physics II 9. This is Text 5 on
the second page of the handout. Let us read through the text together, and then I’ll zero in on
the parts of it that are important for me.
0.4. Reading Physics II 9
The general structure of the passage is as follows. In part [A] Aristotle asks a question,
and in part [F] he answers the question. In between, he describes a view that was current in
his time about the sort of necessity that applies to natural things (I’m calling this the Wall
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Theory, in part [B]). Then he rejects this view (in [C] and [D]), and (in [E]) he adopts the
view that natural things are subject to necessity in a different sense, namely in the sense of be-
ing needed. I have a special interest today in the Wall Theory (in part [B]) and Aristotle’s re-
jection of it (in part [C]). For the sort of necessity in the Wall Theory is the sort that Aristotle
contrasts with teleology, and that is what I want us to reach an understanding of today. But I
will also say a word about the question and answer that bracket it.
In part A, Aristotle opens with a question:
T5 [A] As for necessity, does it belong hypothetically or without qualification?
In part B, he gives us an analogy designed to illustrate how his contemporaries think that
necessity figures in natural generation.
[B] For nowadays people think of necessity as being in generation as if someone
were to suppose that a wall had come into being from necessity because heavy
things are naturally disposed (pephuke) to move downward and light things
upward, because of which the stones and foundations went down, the earth
went above them because of its lightness, and the wood went uppermost, since
it is lightest.
This analogy is a highly simplified, and therefore highly implausible, story about the
process by which a wall comes into being. The story includes only two causally relevant prop-
erties (weight and lightness), and no interactions between things. But I think it does (in its
stripped-down way) exhibit the essential features, as Aristotle saw them, of the explanations
that his contemporaries were giving of natural phenomena.
In part C of the passage, Aristotle contradicts the story about walls.
[C] Whereas, although the wall has not come into being without these things, it
has not come into being because of them except as because of matter, but for
the sake of concealing certain things and preserving them.
Aristotle contradicts the wall theory by making two assertions. First: the wall has not
come into being because of the stones, earth, and wood except as because of matter. Second: the
wall has come into being for the sake of concealing and preserving things. He connects these
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two statements by joining them in a sentence of the form ‘Not p but rather q.’ So again we’ve
got an opposition that we’ll need eventually to explain.
Part D generalizes the claims of part C.
[D] Similarly in all cases in which things are for the sake of something: though not
without things having a necessary nature, not because of them except as be-
cause of matter, but for the sake of something.
Aristotle generalizes from the wall to ‘all cases in which things are for the sake of some-
thing’, and from stones, earth and wood to ‘things having a necessary nature’. In all these cas-
es, he says, the thing in question does not come into being because of the things having a nec-
essary nature except as because of matter, and does come into being for the sake of something.
This completes Aristotle’s rejection of the way in which his contemporaries think about nat-
ural necessity.
In E, Aristotle presents his own positive view about the way in which necessity is involved
in nature.
[E] For example, why is the axe like this? In order that this, and for the sake of
that. But it is impossible for that for the sake of which to come about unless
the axe is made of iron. Hence it is necessary for it to be made of iron if there
will be an axe and its work.
Here is the rough idea. Suppose that something exists, or happens, or has some feature,
for the sake of an end T. And suppose that T cannot be attained unless X is in place, where X
is some sort of means to, or condition for, T’s attainment. Then X is necessary. ‘Necessary’
here means something like ‘needed’. 
In this passage Aristotle proposes to understand being necessary, in the sense of being
needed, in terms of being conditionally straight necessary: when X is needed, there is an end
T such that, straight necessarily, if T will be attained then X is in place.⁹
Finally, Aristotle returns to his opening question and gives an answer to it.
9. Although this seems to be what Aristotle says, it is clearly too strong. Perhaps something closer to the truth
is: X is needed when there is an end T such that necessarily, if T can reliably be expected to be attained, then X is
in place.
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[F] What is necessary is necessary hypothetically, and not as an end. For the nec-
essary is in the matter, while that for the sake of which is in the account.
I will talk about this sentence in a moment.
0.4.1. Hypothetical Necessity
When we read this passage, it is natural to expect the two alternatives in Aristotle’s
opening question to match up with the two alternatives he endorses and rejects in the main
body of the passage. So, it is tempting to think that, in the opening question, ‘hypothetically
necessary’ means something like ‘needed for the achievement of an end’, and ‘necessary with-
out qualification’ means something like ‘resulting from, or necessitated by, the natural mo-
tions of material stuffs’. Pretty much all commentators have thought this. For example, Ross
expresses this view in his commentary on the Physics, and, as I mentioned, John Cooper’s ac-
count of hypothetical necessity follows this pattern as well.
But a survey of Aristotle’s use of the phrases ‘hypothetically’ and ‘without qualification’
throughout his corpus does not suggest any way that these phrases could be used to mean
what they would have to mean in order for that to be Aristotle’s question. Rather, it seems like
Aristotle is simply asking whether things are conditionally necessary or unconditionally nec-
essary. This is most easily understood as a question about Straight necessity. It does not line
up with the question in the middle of the passage about Aimless necessity vs. necessity as
Need.
So what are [A] and [F] doing there, bookending [B]–[E]? Well, I suggest that the contro-
versy in those middle paragraphs is orthogonal to the opening question, but that Aristotle
thinks the outcome of the controversy determines how we should go about answering the
opening question. Here’s the idea. Suppose we know that q necessarily follows from p. Then if
we also know that p is necessary (full stop), we can infer that q is necessary (full stop). If we
know that p is contingent, well, nothing follows about the necessity or contingency of q, but
Aristotle sometimes talks as if he can infer that q is contingent (GC 2.11, 337b25 ff.). Maybe
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there’s some extra, tacit premise in these contexts, something to the effect that if anything is
going to make q necessary, it’s p.
Now, we could think of the Wall Theorist in [B] and the Need-based theorist in [E] as
offering up different conditional necessities. The Wall Theorist thinks that the wall necessarily
results from a certain antecedent configuration of stone, earth and wood. The Need-based
Theorist thinks, let’s suppose, that the wall is a necessary condition for the protection of her
property. Then we ask each theorist whether the wall comes into being necessarily (full stop).
The Wall Theorist will say Yes if she thinks that the antecedent configuration was necessary
(full stop). Otherwise she’ll probably say No. On the other hand, the Need-based Theorist will
say yes if she thinks it is necessary (full stop) that her property is protected. Otherwise, she’ll
probably say No. So, the approach to answering the ‘merely conditionally, or unconditional-
ly?’ question is different depending on what sort of conditional necessity we think things are
subject to, and what candidates we think there are for making things unconditionally
necessary.
That is my proposal for how to tie the passage as a whole together. When Aristotle reaches
part [F], he has told us that necessity in nature is need-based necessity. So, he can answer the
‘hypothetical or unqualified?’ question by answering the question whether or not the ends for
which things are needed are themselves necessarily achieved. They are not (that is what ‘not
as an end’ conveys, a13-14); so the things needed for their achievement are not; they are only
hypothetically necessary. On this proposal, the text turns out to be somewhat poorly sign-
posted, but to represent a coherent line of thought.
0.4.2. Aimless Necessity
Now let’s look at the notion of necessity that is at work in the Wall Theory. See [B]. What
is the sense in which this story about the wall gives us reason to say that the wall has come
into being from necessity?
The story shares some phrasing with an earlier passage at the beginning of chapter 8,
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where Aristotle described people as saying, ‘since the hot is naturally disposed (pephuke)
thus, and the cold thus, and so on for each such thing, therefore this is or comes about from
necessity’. In the present passage, he has someone say that a wall has come into being from
necessity ‘because heavy things are naturally disposed (pephuke) to move downward and light
things upward’. In both passages, necessity is associated with how certain things ‘pephuke’—
which is, very roughly, how they are naturally disposed to behave or act or be affected. And
looking back at T4, we see something similar: the remark that ‘necessity’ can signify ‘that
things are, and are naturally disposed, thus.’ There are other passages too in which the word
‘necessary’ appears in conjunction with talk about how things pephuke, how they are natural-
ly disposed, to act. I take the conjunction of these words as a signal that Aristotle has this par-
ticular notion of necessity in mind, namely the notion that I’m after, the one that he contrasts
with teleology.
The wall-theorist refers to the properties of heaviness and lightness. She claims that the
bearers of these properties are naturally disposed to do certain things: namely, to move
downward and to move upward. She describes a situation in which, because some things are
naturally disposed to move downward and upward, they do in fact move downward and up-
ward, and the result of this is that they come to be arranged as in a wall.
Aristotle’s Wall-theorist does not explicitly claim that, given their natural dispositions, it
is impossible for the things not to move downward and upward, or that it is impossible for
them not to become arranged as in a wall. He just says that they move into the arrangement
because they are naturally disposed to move as they are. This is striking. Aristotle is illustrat-
ing a way of thinking about something he calls ‘necessity’, but his description of it focuses
squarely on the causal or explanatory features of situations, not on their modal features.
And Aristotle’s focus stays on the causal or explanatory features in his rejection of the wall
theory. He says, to repeat, that the wall
has not come into being because of these things except as because of matter,
but for the sake of concealing certain things and preserving them.
Saying that something does or does not occur because of some things is a way of address-
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ing the question why the thing occurs. Saying that something occurs for the sake of something
is also a way of addressing the question why the thing occurs. So, both parts of Aristotle’s re-
sponse to the wall theory consist in claims about the causal or explanatory features of a situa-
tion, as distinct from its purely modal features.
My proposal, then, is that the anti-teleological variety of necessity, which is in play in this
passage, consists primarily in having or lacking certain sorts of causes, and not in having a
certain modal status. In this respect anti-teleological necessity differs from straight necessity:
being straight necessary does not consist in having or lacking any particular sort of cause.1⁰ I
suggest that one of Aristotle’s accomplishments was to extract the more purely modal notion
of straight necessity out of the fundamentally causal notions he inherited from his
predecessors.
0.4.3. Final, material, and efficient causes
I have just proposed that being necessary in the anti-teleogical sense means having or
lacking certain sorts of causes. Which sorts of causes?
Let us look yet again at the sentence in which Aristotle contradicts the Wall theory. The
wall ‘(1) has not come into being because of these things except as because of matter, but (2)
for the sake of concealing certain things and preserving them.’
Aristotle is commonly taken here to be denying that matter plays a genuine explanatory
role. But what he is literally saying is simply this: the stone, earth and wood are material caus-
es of the wall’s coming into being and not any other of the four kinds of cause. (T6 shows an
example of this same ‘as’ locution used to refer to kinds of cause.) He takes the Wall theorist
to regard them as another kind of cause as well.
And indeed, the Wall Theorist pretty clearly takes stone, earth and wood to be function-
10. Indirectly, straight necessity does have consequences for a thing’s causes. For example, if an object exists
necessarily then it exists always, so it has not been produced and hence has no efficient cause. (A straight neces-
sary motion, on the other hand, can have an efficient cause.) Also, anything made of (generable) matter is per-
ishable, so if something exists necessarily it is not made of (generable) matter.
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ing as efficient causes as well as material causes. She describes the wall’s coming into being as
resulting from the natural dispositions these materials have in so far as they are heavy or
light. So we could say she thinks that the materials, or their heaviness and lightness, bring
about the wall’s coming into being. And that’s what an efficient cause is. So in a nutshell: the
Wall Theorist says that stone, earth and wood are both material causes and efficient causes of
the wall’s coming into being; Aristotle says, they are not efficient causes but only material
causes of the wall’s coming into being.
Let me illustrate the difference between Aristotle’s view and the view of his opponent.
First, I hold a figure of Saint Anthony in my hand and move it about. Here, then, is Saint An-
thony being moved by me. There is a motion here, and there is a way in which the motion de-
pends on Anthony; the motion occurs, in part, because Anthony exists. When a change de-
pends on Anthony in that way, he is functioning as a material cause: he is a cause of the
change ‘as its subject’ or ‘as matter’. There’s another way in which the motion depends on me;
it occurs, in part, because I exist. When a change depends on me in that way, I am function-
ing as an efficient cause: I am a cause ‘as that whence the motion’. (Undergoing a motion is a
material way of being responsible for it; bringing about a motion is an efficient way of being
responsible for it.)
Next, I hop around. This time the material and efficient cause coincide: I am both the
thing that undergoes the motion, and and the one who brings about the motion.
The Wall Theorist thinks of the wall’s coming into being as like my hopping: the things
that undergo it are also the things that bring it about. Aristotle thinks of it instead as like An-
thony’s motion (where the material and efficient causes are distinct).
In addition to denying that stone & co. are efficient causes of the wall’s coming into being,
Aristotle affirms that the wall comes into being ‘for the sake of concealing certain things and
preserving them.’ The denial and the affirmation are joined in a ‘not… but…’ construction. So
Aristotle is treating the claim he affirms about the change’s final cause (what the change hap-
pens for the sake of) as an alternative to the claim he denies about the change’s efficient causes
(what brings the change about).
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But having an efficient cause and having a final cause are not, in general, alternatives to
each other. I would not say, for example, ‘The statue was not brought into being by Michelan-
gelo but for the sake of beauty.’ But it does seem as if Aristotle takes having stone, earth and
wood as efficient causes as an alternative to having concealment and protection as final causes.
This makes sense if Aristotle accepts it as obvious that whenever stone, earth, and wood
bring about a change in virtue of their weight and lightness, the change does not occur for the
sake of concealment and protection. If he accepts this it is presumably as an instance of a
more general rule. Here is a guess at the general rule. We start with a broad division among
efficient causes. Some, like skills, crafts, desires, policies, and (in Aristotle’s view) natures,
have a goal-directed character: they characteristically bring things about for the sake of a
goal. Others do not have this character: they do not characteristically bring things about for
the sake of a goal. Perhaps weight, lightness, heat and cold are examples. Let’s call the first
group ‘goal-directed powers’, and the second group ‘aimless powers’. (I am using the word
‘power’ more loosely than Aristotle uses the word δύναμις.) The general rule is: if a change
occurs for the sake of something, then it is efficiently caused by a goal-directed power.
The thought is that, in the realm of changes, having a final cause implies being efficiently
caused by a goal-directed power, while being aimless necessary implies being efficiently
caused by an aimless power. Being efficiently caused by a goal-directed power is an alterna-
tive to being efficiently caused by an aimless power; so, by extension, having a final cause is
an alternative to being efficiently caused by an aimless power.
Compare, ‘This wasn’t deposited there by the wind—it was left here to warn us!’ Or, in the
other direction, ‘I did not bump into you in order to offend you, but because I was pushed.’
(If I am right that Aristotle accepts this rule, it could have applications in thinking further
about Aristotle’s teleology, or at least the teleology of changes. It might provide an approach
to the question how far Aristotle’s teleology is compatible with ‘the modern scientific world-
view’ [is there such a thing?].)
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0.4.4. Aimless necessity again
Let us review some essential features of the Wall Story.
(i) The efficient causes of the change coincide with the material causes of the change
(In other words, the process is undergone by the very things that bring it about)
(ii) The efficient causes of the change are aimless powers (heaviness, lightness)
(iii) The change does not occur for the sake of what its product will do (and maybe not for
the sake of anything at all)
Let’s try out the following suggestion, then, about what is conveyed by saying that the
change occurs from necessity: namely, that the change has the second feature. So, it is at least
a sufficient condition for a change’s being necessary in this sense that the change be efficiently
caused by aimless powers. Let us call necessity in this sense, ‘Aimless Necessity’.
Perhaps we should add that being Aimless-necessary is a matter of being efficiently
caused by basic, or simple, or low-level aimless powers. Heaviness and lightness, and heat and
cold, in the context of ancient science, were regarded as relatively primitive, basic properties.
There are more complex, high-level aimless dispositions. For example, there’s a friend of mine
who has this kind of quirk or tic, such that whenever he hears the words ‘blue moon’ he starts
singing the song ‘Blue Moon’. I don’t know whether or not Aristotle would say that, when this
happens, he sings the song ‘from (aimless) necessity’.
I’d like to lay out some merits of the view that Aristotle takes what I call Aimless Necessity
as a distinct sense of necessity, and that he identifies being aimless necessary with being effi-
ciently caused by aimless powers.
Thinking of aimless necessity in this way makes sense of a good number of passages. In
the biological writings, especially the Parts of Animals, there are a number of things that Aris-
totle says come about from necessity, where he seems to envisage an explanation broadly in
the style of the Wall Theory. In all these cases, it seems to make sense to think that what he
means by ‘from necessity’ is that the things are brought about by aimless powers. Some exam-
ples are listed on the bottom of page 4 of the handout:
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Blood decomposes into serum by necessity. Human heads are hairier than other animals’
heads from necessity, because they’re so moist. Eyelashes grow from necessity, because veins
end there and a sort of moisture seeps out. Deer horns fall off from necessity, because, unlike
some other animals’ horns, they are not hollow, so they are heavy, which makes them fall off.
In certain animals that have extra earthy material, this material flows to their head from ne-
cessity; and from that point, the material can be made use of to make horns or tusks or extra
big sharp teeth. Also, certain frightened animals discharge their bladders from necessity.
(This, again, is something nature can make use of, for example in the case of squids. They’ve
got ink; when they are frightened they discharge this ink, which distracts the predator and
the squid has a chance of getting away.)
Another merit of the proposal is that if we think of aimless necessity in this way, it makes
good sense why it would both stand in opposition to, and also be combinable with, having an
aim. So it works out nicely comparable to the case of ‘not addressing the king but the queen’.
They are alternatives, but they don’t strictly exclude each other. They are alternatives because
(1) being efficiently caused by an aimless power is an alternative to being efficiently caused by
a goal-directed power, (2) being aimless necessary implies being efficiently caused by an aim-
less power, and (3) having an aim (if you’re a change) implies being efficiently caused by a
goal-directed power. They don’t strictly exclude each other because a change can have more
than one efficient cause. An interesting case of this, for Aristotle, is where a change has a
proximate efficient cause that is used as an instrument by a more remote efficient cause.
So, for example, let’s say that fire has an aimless power to heat things when it comes into
contact with them (and when they are not already as hot as fire). If some fire comes by chance
into contact with a stone, the stone will heat up, without heating up for the sake of anything.
But suppose I put a fire under a pan. Now I am using the fire as an instrument, and if I do this
with the purpose of frying eggs, then the pan heats up for the sake of frying eggs. The pan
heats up from aimless necessity (‘that’s just what fire does’, we might say) but also for the sake
of something.
Rosen–varieties of necessity – draft
 16 of 18
Aristotle seems to describe situations of just this kind. Two examples are Texts 7 and 8 on
the handout.
T7 Nature uses both heat and cold; they have powers from necessity so as to act in
this way and that, but nevertheless, in things that are coming into being, it results
that the one cools and the other heats for the sake of something. (GA II 6, 743a36)
Here heat and cold are said to have certain powers from necessity, which is contrasted
(‘but nevertheless’) with their cooling and heating for the sake of something. Their cooling
and heating for the sake of something seems to be tied to the fact that they are used by na-
ture. It looks like Aristotle has a case in mind very much like the story I told.
T8 These are causes as movers and tools, and as matter. […] Saying that the causes
are from necessity is like thinking that water drains out from people with dropsy
because of the knife alone, and not on account of being healthy, which is that for
the sake of which the knife cuts. (GA V.8, 789b7–15.)
The phrase ‘causes as movers and tools’ is a hendiadys. The things are causes as tools used
to impart motion. And they are also causes as matter. So here we have a sort of refinement or
elaboration on the picture we got in Physics II 9. There Aristotle said that heavy and light
things are causes as matter and in no other way. Now he allows them to be efficient causes as
well, but not ultimate efficient causes. They act as efficient causes under the instrumental con-
trol of goal-directed powers.
These are two benefits of thinking of aimless necessity in the way I suggest.
There remains one last important question. Why would the notion of aimless necessity, as
I have proposed to understand it, be called ‘necessity’ (ἀνάγκη)? Does it hang together in
some way with the other notions of necessity—with need, compulsion, and straight necessity?
We could ask this question already about the other three kinds of necessity on their own,
and T9 shows Aristotle’s attempt to answer it by paraphrasing compulsion and need in terms
of straight necessity. We could follow his lead and offer the following account of aimless ne-
cessity: X results from aimless necessity iff there is a configuration of aimless powers in place
such that straight necessarily, if the configuration is in place then X is brought about by the
aimless powers.
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Three equivalences are offered on the handout. None of them is true, but they could prob-
ably be patched up (we can discuss if you like). Even if they were true, though, would they ex-
plain why the notions count as varieties of a single thing, or explain why all the notions are
expressed by the same word? I am inclined to say No. There are all sorts of notions that can
be analyzed employing straight necessary conditionals, but which cannot (under ordinary
circumstances) be expressed by the word ‘necessity’ or ἀνάγκη alone. There must be some
other unifying factor which makes it understandable why these notions can all be expressed
by the single same word.
One place we might look to is the range of practical situations where we say ‘I had no
choice’ or ‘I couldn’t help it’. It seems as if cases of need and cases of compulsion could both
prompt this sort of statement. ‘I had no choice: it was the only way to launch the expedition,’
or ‘I had no choice in the matter: a gale blew my ship to Sicily.’ Perhaps some sort of general-
ization of that (so as to cover natural events as well as practical ones) could account for the
notions of necessity as need and necessity as compulsion.
It isn’t immediately clear how well this sort of story would work for aimless necessity. I
think of the old joke where the scorpion says, ‘I can’t help it, it’s my nature.’ Maybe a transfer-
al of that sort of thought from scorpions over to rock and water and fire and so forth could
account for this usage? We could also think about the role of necessity in Plato’s Timaeus,
where the notion of necessity seems very close to that of aimless necessity, and where the nec-
essary coincides with what the divine craftsman is given to work with; so this is the stuff that
the divine craftsman has no choice about.
This line of questioning could lead into a whole other story, but it is time to wrap up. 
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Why Does Aristotle Oppose Necessity to Teleology?
Jacob Rosen
Part One
T1 We must explain, first, why nature is among the causes that are for the sake of
something, and then about the necessary and how it figures in natural affairs.
(Phys. II 8, 198b10-12)
T2 What is to prevent nature from acting, not for the sake of something […] but
from necessity? (Phys. II 8, 298b16–19)
Are the two topics related? Does something’s being necessary (or not) have any bearing on its be-
ing for the sake of something (or not)? It doesn’t seem so:
Not for the sake of anything For the sake of something
Contingent (i) Chance occurrences (ii) Deliberate actions
Necessary (iii) Existence of mathematical objects; Truth of logical principles
(iv) Existence of the sphere of fixed 
stars; Rotation of same sphere
(References: (i) Physics II 4–6; (ii) Nicomachean Ethics III 3; (iv) De Caelo II 3, Metaphysics Λ 7)
But not so fast: remember that Aristotle acknowledges more than one sense of ‘necessary’.
T3 We call necessary:
[needed:] that without which, as a contributory cause, something cannot live […]
or without which something good cannot exist or come to be, or something bad
cannot be thrown off or taken away […];
[compelled:] the compulsory and compulsion: this is what impedes and hinders in
opposition to impulse and choice […];
[straight necessary:] and if something cannot be otherwise, we say that it is nec-
essarily so.
All the others are in some way called necessary in accordance with this last necessity.
(Metaph. Δ 5, 1015a20–36)
T4 Necessity signifies either that
[needed:] if that for the sake of which will be, it is necessary to have these things; or
that
[•:] things are, and are naturally disposed (pephuke), thus. (PA I 1, 642a32 ff.)
Proposal: •-necessity can be contrasted with being for the sake of something.
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Part Two
The text:
T5 [A] Opening Question
As for necessity, does it belong hypothetically or without qualification?
[B] Opponent’s View of Natural Necessity: The Wall Theory
For nowadays people think of necessity as being in generation as if someone were to
suppose that a wall had come into being from necessity because heavy things are na-
turally disposed (pephuke) to move downward and light things upward, because of
which the stones and foundations went down, the earth went above them because of
its lightness, and the wood went uppermost, since it is lightest.
[C] Aristotle’s Denial of the Wall Theory
Whereas, although the wall has not come into being without these things, it has not
come into being because of them except as because of matter, but rather for the sake
of concealing certain things and preserving them.
[D] Aristotle Generalizes His Denial of the Wall Theory
Similarly in all cases in which things are for the sake of something: though not with-
out things having a necessary nature, not because of them except as because of mat-
ter, but for the sake of something.
[E] Aristotle’s View of Natural Necessity: Necessity As Need
For example, why is the axe like this? In order that this, and for the sake of that. But
it is impossible for that for the sake of which to come about unless the axe is made of
iron. Hence it is necessary for it to be made of iron if there will be an axe and its
work.
[F] Answer to the Opening Question
What is necessary is necessary hypothetically, and not as an end. For the necessary is
in the matter, while that for the sake of which is in the account. (Phys. II 9, 199b34–
200a15)
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Part Three
The opening question has two alternatives: Hypothetical necessity; Unqualified necessity.
Parts [B]–[E] have two alternatives: Wall Theory-style necessity; Necessity as Need.
A tempting and widely-held reading:
• The alternatives in the opening question correspond to the alternatives that Aristotle accepts
and rejects in parts [B]–[E].
• Hypothetical necessity = Necessity as Need. When Aristotle says ‘hypothetically necessary’,
he means: necessary as a conditio sine qua non for the achievement of an end.
• Unqualified necessity = Wall Theory-style necessity. When Aristotle says, ‘necessary without
qualification’ in this passage, he means: resulting necessarily from antecedent material con-
ditions (or something along those lines).
My proposed reading:
• The pair of alternatives in the opening question is orthogonal to the pair of alternatives that
Aristotle accepts and rejects in parts [B]–[E].
• The passage involves three types of necessity:
(1) Straight Necessity (Ar.’s question: does this apply conditionally or unconditionally?)
(2) Aimless necessity: what the wall-theorist appeals to in [B]
(3) necessity as need: what Aristotle describes in [E]
• On my reading, the passage discusses two different questions about necessity, and the an-
swer to one does not settle the answer to the other. However, the answer to the one affects
how we can go about deciding the other.
• [aimless:] X is necessitated by antecedent material conditions, so X is unconditionally
necessary if the antecedent material conditions are unconditionally necessary.
• [need:] X is necessary for the achievement of an end, so X is unconditionally necessary
if the end’s achievement is unconditionally necessary.
• Aristotle endorses the need view, and then, in [F], he says that things are merely condi-
tionally necessary, on the grounds that ends are merely contingently achieved.
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Part Four
In what sense of ‘necessity’ does the wall in [B] come into being from necessity?
The story and Aristotle’s denial of it both focus on explanatory (rather than purely modal) fea-
tures of the situation.
Wall Theorist: The things ‘pephuke’ to move up and down
that’s⇣why
The things move up and down
that’s⇣why
The things end up configured as a wall
Aristotle: The wall comes into being because of the things only as because of matter;
The wall comes into being for the sake of concealment and protection.
Only as because of matter means: they are material causes and not any other kind of cause
T6 Since causes are spoken of in many ways, there turn out to be many causes of the
same thing […] not in the same way, but one as matter, another as source of mo-
tion. (Physics II 3, 195a4–8)
Some Central Features of the Wall Theory
(i) The efficient causes of the change coincide with the material causes of the change
(ii) The efficient causes of the change are aimless powers (heaviness, lightness)
(iii) The change does not occur for the sake of what its product will do
I Propose That In the Wall Theory ‘Necessity’ Means This: feature (ii) is expressed by ‘from ne-
cessity’; feature (iii) is taken to follow from it.
Aimless Necessity (proposed account): Something is Aimless-necessary iff it is efficiently
caused by aimless powers.
Question: should we say, ‘… of basic/simple/low-level aimless powers’?
I Propose That Aristotle Assumes: if a change happens for the sake of something, then it is effi-
ciently caused by a goal-directed power.
Merits of the proposed definition, and a question:
⊕ Makes sense of many passages
• Things attributed to ‘necessity’ in Parts of Animals: blood decomposes into serum;
human heads are the hairiest; eyelashes grow; deer horns fall off; earthy material flows to
the head; frightened animals discharge their bladders; etc. (PA 651a17; 658b3; 658b21;
663b13; 663b32; 679a24)
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⊕ Explains why Aimless necessity would be opposed to, but also combinable with, aims
• Being Aimless-necessary means being brought about by an aimless power.
• If a change happens for the sake of something, it is brought about by a goal-directed
power.
• One power can be controlled and used as an instrument by another. When a goal-direct-
ed power uses an aimless power to bring about a change, then the change happens both
from Aimless necessity and for the sake of a goal. (Example: you use a fire to heat a pan.)
T7 Nature uses both heat and cold; they have powers from necessity so as to act in this
way and that, but nevertheless, in things that are coming into being, it results that
the one cools and the other heats for the sake of something. (GA II 6, 743a36)
T8 These are causes as movers and tools, and as matter. […] Saying that the causes are
from necessity is like thinking that water drains out from people with dropsy be-
cause of the knife alone, and not on account of being healthy, which is that for the
sake of which the knife cuts. (GA V.8, 789b7–15.)
  ? ⃝ Why is this called ‘necessity’? And is it related to Straight necessity?
The question could also be raised for the other kinds of necessity.
T9 A thing is said to do or suffer what is necessary in the sense of compulsory, only
when it cannot act according to its impulse because of the compelling force,—which
implies that necessity is that because of which a thing cannot be otherwise; and sim-
ilarly as regards the conditions of life and of good; for when in the one case good, in
the other life and being, are not possible without certain conditions, these are neces-
sary. (Metaph. Δ 5, 1015a36–b6, trans. Ross)
Aristotle seems to say:
   (i) I am compelled to do X iff I do X while a force is applied to me such that straight
necessarily, if the force is applied then I do X. (Or?: …then I do not do what I want.)
   (ii) I need to have X iff I have an important end T such that straight necessarily, if I
achieve T then I have X (sc. as a contributing cause of the achievement of T).
I could follow his lead and say:
   (iii) X results from aimless necessity when there is a configuration of aimless powers in
place such that straight necessarily, if the configuration is in place then X is brought
about by the aimless powers.
But all three equivalences (a) are false, (b) don’t explain the usage of ‘necessity’.
Perhaps the unity of the usages of ‘necessity’ appears in practical contexts: ‘I had no choice’.
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